Nuclear Proliferation Over the Next Decade: Causes, Warning Signs, and Policy Responses by Lavoy, Peter R.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Center on Contemporary Conflict Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC) Conferences
2006
Nuclear Proliferation Over the Next




NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION OVER THE NEXT
DECADE
Causes, Warning Signs, and Policy Responses
Peter R. Lavoy
The intensification of the Iranian and North Korean nuclear crises causes concern that
deteriorating security conditions in the Middle East and Northeast Asia will lead additional
countries to seek nuclear weapons. This special issue, which is based on a conference organized by
the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, examines the factors
that are likely to shape nuclear proliferation in the next ten years. This introduction analyzes the
conditions and events that might drive new countries to pursue nuclear weapons; the indicators
and cautionary signs that can provide early warning that a country is trying to build nuclear
bombs; and the policy measures that can be adopted to prevent or at least dissuade new
proliferators. A novel analytical approach is developed, focusing on the role of nuclear myths and
mythmakers to help analysts better understand and policymakers better manage nuclear
proliferation over the next decade.
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Combating the international spread of nuclear weapons has been a top security concern
for the United States since 1944, when Washington partnered with London in a secret
effort to monopolize the world’s uranium and thorium supplies so that none would fall
into German or Soviet hands.1 Ever since then, abundant governmental resources have
been levied in the struggle to block or discourage new countries from acquiring nuclear
forces and to encourage countries that have initiated bomb development programs to
reverse those efforts. But the track record of the United States and other concerned
countries in countering nuclear proliferation is mixed. There have been many cases when
the U.S. intelligence community managed to identify nuclear aspirants early enough in
the bomb acquisition process to enable policymakers to take timely action to impede
these efforts, or to persuade these countries to pursue alternate security strategies. But in
several other situations there was either a lack of timely intelligence or policymakers were
unable (or unwilling) to take effective measures to prevent proliferation.
The chief result of this uneven nonproliferation record is that nuclear capabilities
have spread to additional countries, although in a gradual and relatively stable manner. In
each of the six decades of the nuclear era, only one or two countries have obtained
nuclear weapons capabilities (the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1940s, the
United Kingdom and France in the 1950s, China and Israel in the 1960s, India and South
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Africa in the 1970s, Pakistan in the 1980s, and North Korea in the 1990s). However, in
today’s rapidly evolving international security environment, it is not altogether certain that
the global system will be able to integrate another nuclear weapon state as smoothly as in
the past. The very same forces that make proliferation so problematic create the
conditions for more countries (and possibly non-state actors) to consider nuclear arms
acquisition. As a result, the pressures on the intelligence and policy communities to
correctly anticipate, obstruct, and dissuade the next nuclear aspirants are extremely high.
This special issue of the Nonproliferation Review brings together leading analysts of
nuclear proliferation to examine the issues that are likely to shape the nuclear proliferation
environment in the next decade. An international conference was organized by the Center
for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, in July
2006 to focus critical attention on this subject, and the papers presented at that event, in
expanded and revised form, constitute this special issue. All 17 authors, with varying
degrees of specificity and emphasis, examine three overarching questions: (1) What
conditions and events drive and enable a country to pursue nuclear weapons? (2)
What indicators and cautionary signs can be identified to provide early warning that a
country is trying to obtain nuclear weapons*and projecting ahead 10 years, what are the
conditions and events that analysts should pay particularly close attention to in order to
gain a deeper and more timely understanding of new proliferation dynamics and trends?
and (3) What policy measures can be adopted to prevent or at least slow the proliferation
process* in general and in specific circumstances*over the next decade in order to keep
the international nuclear order as stable as it has been in past decades? These three
questions are also taken up in the remainder of this introduction.
Causes of Nuclear Proliferation
Two theoretical perspectives compete to explain the causes of nuclear proliferation. The
realist (or neo-realist) perspective contends that states pursue nuclear weapons to offset
international security threats.2 At a fundamental level, all nuclear bomb development
programs constitute a response to insecurity and a form of balancing against foreign
threats*be they political or military in nature. But the theoretical framework of realism is
too abstract to allow precise predictions about the conditions under which states will
build nuclear bombs instead of pursuing other time-honored defense policies, such as
strengthening their conventional military capabilities, acquiring different weapons of mass
destruction, or forging alliances with foreign powers. Moreover, it cannot explain the
timing of proliferation decisions or key policy shifts because it operates at a systemic level
of analysis and thus does not take into account specific political, technical, or
psychological factors that affect the day-to-day dynamics of any nuclear weapons
program. In order to understand why some countries seek nuclear deterrence instead
of more conventional defense strategies, or why some countries race to get the bomb
while others take more leisurely or circuitous routes, the problem must be considered
from an alternate theoretical perspective.
Smith College Professor Jacques Hymans contends that the idealist paradigm does a
better job of explaining nuclear proliferation. Focusing on ideas produced by national,
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cultural, or individual attributes, idealist approaches can explain much about the
worldviews, motives, and decisionmaking styles of specific state leaders.3 However,
most idealist arguments, such as those that posit strategic culture as a driving force
behind nuclear bomb programs, suffer the same limitation as realism.4 Both approaches
highlight boundaries on the freedom of choice of national leaders*realists point to the
constraints caused by international competition, and cultural idealists show how the
values and beliefs of a population or national organizations bind policy options*but
neither perspective has an adequate explanation for when and why policymakers choose
to ignore these constraints, as they so often do.5
Similarly, idealist approaches focusing on the psychology of national leaders
emphasize the constraints of cognition or affect and have trouble with ‘‘out-of-character’’
behavior triggered by domestic or international shocks. This is the classic levels of analysis
problem.6 No theory of nuclear proliferation will be valuable to policymakers seeking to
understand and influence the proliferation environment of 2016 unless it can account for
both the changes and the continuities of new nuclear weapons programs.
A possible solution lies with an approach I call ‘‘nuclear mythmaking.’’ According to
this perspective, a state is likely to make the pursuit of nuclear weapons part of its national
security strategy when national elites (nuclear mythmakers), who want their government
to adopt this strategy, (1) emphasize their country’s insecurity or its poor international
standing; (2) portray this strategy as the best corrective for these problems; (3) articulate
the political, economic, and technical feasibility of acquiring nuclear weapons; (4)
successfully associate these beliefs and arguments (nuclear myths) with existing cultural
norms and political priorities; and finally (5) convince senior decisionmakers to accept and
act on these views.
Of course, competing myths also may exist and would be spread in the same
fashion. Thus, if enterprising and well-connected strategic elites manage to cultivate a
national*or at least a governmental*consensus around the notion that developing
nuclear weapons would make the country less secure or less influential, then the
government is not likely to initiate or continue to invest in a weapons development
program. At any given time and in any given country, multiple strategic myths may coexist
and compete with one another.
The success of one nuclear myth over another generally depends on three factors:
(1) the substantive content of the myth and its compatibility with prevailing cultural norms
and political priorities, (2) the ability of the mythmaker to legitimize and popularize his or
her beliefs among fellow elites and then to persuade national leaders to act on these
beliefs, and finally (3) the process whereby institutional actors reorient mission priorities
and budgets and integrate the popularized myths into their own organizational identities,
rules, and objectives.7 This emphasis on nuclear mythmaking is not intended to downplay
the significance of actual security threats as powerful pressures for countries to seek
nuclear weapons. In fact, it is difficult to think of any governmental official calling for the
manufacture of nuclear arms without an overriding interest in solving some pressing
security problem. Nearly all of the authors of this issue accept the realist credo: The real
world does matter. Nuclear myths and the existence of genuine security threats are closely
correlated. The chief distinction between the mythmaker approach and realism lies at the
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level of analysis. Whereas security-oriented (and even most idealist) accounts focus on
the prior events or conditions that are said to trigger a certain strategic response, the
mythmaking approach emphasizes the strategic beliefs and political maneuvering that link
these same triggering conditions to the subsequent policy debate and decision and then
to the actual process of implementing this policy.8 National leaders are known to accept
some policy constraints and yet ignore or overcome others. Studying the role of myths
and mythmakers provides important insights into the process by which this selection of
priorities occurs. Heads of state as well as nuclear mythmakers (sometimes they are the
same people) operate within the confines of the international environment as well as their
own nation’s political culture (and even their own psychology). But they generally have
some degree of freedom to reorient and expand the internal and external boundaries of
their behavior. Significant policy changes are risky, however. The more a leader
or mythmaker tries to extend the boundaries of traditional behavior, the greater the
risk he or she runs domestically and internationally. The unorthodox actions of Pakistani
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto during the early to mid-1970s illustrate this point.
Although Bhutto had the vision and courage to put Pakistan on the path to nuclear
weapons ownership when the country had limited financial resources and only
rudimentary industrial and scientific capabilities, his many other innovative and non-
traditional policies created enormous domestic turmoil and ultimately led to a military
coup and his imprisonment and execution in 1979.9
Drawing on the mythmaking model, many of the case study authors in this issue
(most more implicitly than explicitly) point to three elements as critical to national nuclear
decisions. The first is the composition, scope, and logical consistency of various
nuclear myths about nuclear weapons and deterrence* for example, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s
conviction that Pakistan could deter a nuclear-armed India only if it had nuclear weapons,
Colonel Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s belief that Egypt needed the bomb to match nuclear-
capable Israel, and Prime Minister John Vorster’s interest in nuclear weapons to counter
the hostile ‘‘encirclement’’ of South Africa.
Second is the identity, background, and skills of successive nuclear mythmakers, or
carriers of these beliefs, that is, Bhutto, Nasser, and Vorster together with the heads of their
national nuclear establishments, A. Q. Khan, Salah Hedayat, and Waldo Stumpf.
The third element is the process of nuclear mythmaking*of legitimizing,
popularizing, and institutionalizing strategic arguments about nuclear arms acquisition
in a state’s national security policy and institutions. Iranian leaders associate nuclear
technology with sovereignty, economic security, and respect for Islam among domestic
and international audiences; defiantly defend Iran’s right to enrich uranium as a member
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); and cultivate political
support for its nuclear policies in capitals as far flung as Caracas and Jakarta.
All of our authors agree (though again many more implicitly than explicitly) that a
given country’s security policies, including its pursuit of nuclear weapons, have been
influenced by the beliefs that a wide range of officials have held about national security
threats and responses. Two kinds of beliefs have played especially important roles in the
development of nuclear weapons programs. The first set of beliefs includes the myths of
nuclear security and nuclear influence. These are beliefs about the desirability of acquiring
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nuclear weapons. The other significant set of beliefs concerns the technical, economic, and
political feasibility of manufacturing nuclear arsenals as well as the utility of using these
weapons for strategic purposes.10 (Table 1 lists these beliefs and summarizes their main
characteristics.)
To cite one example, U.S. Air War College professor Stephen Burgess relates in this
issue that in the case of South Africa, the myths of nuclear security and technical feasibility
were closely linked: ‘‘South African scientists demonstrated the feasibility of nuclear
uranium enrichment at the same time the county began to experience increased threats
from enemies in the region and throughout the world.’’11 This linkage between desirability
and feasibility of weapons production is just as evident in the countries that initiated
research and development programs for nuclear bombs only later to reverse course. Libya
is the classic example.
As national security analyst Torrey Froscher recounts elsewhere in this issue, Colonel
Muammar Qaddafi tried and failed to purchase nuclear weapons outright from China in
the 1970s. He later failed in various efforts to buy bomb production materials and
technologies from India, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, Argentina, Brazil, and Belgium during
the 1970s and 1980s. Then in the 1990s and 2000s, when U.S. intelligence blocked
his attempts to acquire a ‘‘full-service’’ nuclear fuel cycle from the A. Q. Khan proliferation
network, Qadhafi finally lost interest in nuclear weapons, choosing instead to reintegrate
Libya into the world political and economic order.12
And in Venezuela today, as Naval Postgraduate School professor Harold Trinkunas
observes elsewhere in this issue, although President Hugo Chavez often promotes the
myths of nuclear security and nuclear influence, these myths have not spread very far or
TABLE 1
Beliefs about Nuclear Weapons
Belief Type Subject of Belief
Nuclear Myths
Nuclear security Relationship between nuclear weapons acquisition
and the political and military dimensions of national security
Nuclear influence Relationship between nuclear weapons acquisition
and the status and political influence of the state in
international affairs
Auxiliary Assertions
Technical feasibility Capacity to overcome technical difficulties associated
with developing nuclear weapons; possibility for
industrial spin-offs
Economic feasibility Capacity to meet financial costs associated with developing
nuclear weapons; possibility for lucrative industrial spin-offs
Political feasibility Capacity to manage political problems associated with
developing nuclear weapons; impact on relations with
important states
Strategic utility Capacity to develop operational nuclear weapons and to
devise options for their effective use in deterrence policies
and military operations
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deep because of the skepticism of his political, economic, and military advisers, all
of whom doubt the political, economic, and technical feasibility of going nuclear, not to
mention the military utility of fielding nuclear weapons so close to the United States.
Warning Signs of Nuclear Proliferation
Academic theories can be of use to national security practitioners if they impart relevant
knowledge about the outside world. They are particularly valuable to the nonproliferation
policymaking process when they generate specific indicators or cautionary signs of a
country’s intent to proceed on a particular pathway of nuclear weapons development. The
authors of this special issue have done just that, identifying valuable indicators of
proliferation intent in three general categories. The first category follows from the nuclear
mythmaking model and contains cautionary signs in the realm of nuclear myths,
mythmakers, and the mythmaking process. The second, ‘‘realist’’ category focuses on
changes in the objective security circumstances in which states find themselves. And the
third category consists of observable indicators of shifts in the technical status of a
country’s nuclear program.
Indicators of Nuclear Myths and Mythmakers
Proliferation analysts can identify many kinds of indicators to show the presence,
evolution, and popularity of nuclear myths and also of the entrepreneurial activities of
the proponents of these myths. Here, three sets of indicators are identified to illustrate the
general utility of this approach: public statements, policy debates, and the movements,
meetings, and statements of nuclear mythmakers.
Public Statements. The first set of indicators is the most obvious: public statements
by governmental leaders, official spokespersons, and other political, military, and scientific
officials concerning nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. In 1965, when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
was foreign minister in President Ayub Khan’s cabinet, he became the first Pakistani official
openly to call for nuclear weapons, proclaiming: ‘‘If India developed an atomic bomb, we
too will develop one even if we have to eat grass or leaves or to remain hungry, because
there is no conventional alternative to the atomic bomb.’’13 Although Khan rejected
Bhutto’s demand for nuclear weapons to counter India, choosing instead to beef up
Pakistan’s conventional defenses and strengthen its security ties to the United States,
Bhutto’s public statements in the 1960s provided a clear indication of the kind of policies
he would pursue in early 1972 upon becoming head of the Pakistani state.
As University of Tampa Professor Maria Rost Rublee observes in this issue, Egyptian
President Gamal Abd al-Nasser publicly proclaimed his interest in obtaining nuclear arms
at the very time he was instructing the Egyptian Atomic Energy Establishment to initiate
preparations for a bomb program. Much more recently, Gamal Mubarak, son of Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak, proposed in an important political speech that Egypt should
pursue a nuclear energy program.14 Although he referred to the use of nuclear technology
to produce electricity not nuclear weapons, such a statement could be a signal
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that Egyptian policymakers are contemplating the initiation of a nuclear program that
might*at some time*provide a weapons option. Or it could be an indication that, like
Bhutto, Gamal Mubarak might become a proponent of nuclear weapons if he were to
succeed his father as president.
Of course, it is not always clear what precise message certain public statements are
intended to convey and to what audiences. Consider the audacious announcement the
North Korean foreign ministry released on October 3, 2006 that Pyongyang ‘‘will in
the future conduct a nuclear test.’’15 At the time, it was not known if this was an advisory
that North Korea would soon test a nuclear device or a sign that the Pyongyang regime
was prepared to resume negotiations with the United States and its four Asian negotiating
partners in an effort to remove U.S.-initiated sanctions over counterfeiting and money
laundering, or some completely different kind of alert. Although North Korea was and is
believed already to possess a few nuclear weapons, a warning sign like this could have
indicated some significant shift in its nuclear policy or posture. As it turns out, North Korea
was the first country to provide its own early warning message that it would soon conduct
its first nuclear explosive detonation, which it did six days after issuing the warning
statement. Despite the advance warning, concerned policymakers in Asia and the United
States were powerless to prevent the North Korean nuclear test.
Policy Debates. Another set of indicators of changes in proliferation intent or
capability can be drawn from governmental policy debates, especially about the political,
economic, and technical feasibility of developing nuclear weapons, and the military utility
of fielding these forces. India’s liveliest nuclear debate was sparked by China’s first nuclear
explosive test in October 1964. Even before that event, the Indian nuclear program chief,
Homi Bhabha, had established the technical and economic feasibility of building nuclear
bombs in India and then lobbied to convince key political elites to approve the
development of a limited nuclear deterrent capability. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri,
the humble and reticent politician who had assumed power after Jawaharlal Nehru’s
death, initially rejected the bomb option, preferring a diplomatic solution to deal with
China. But Bhabha was so effective in swaying the internal feasibility arguments and
creating a wellspring of political support for the bomb program, that by early 1965 Shastri
had no alternative but to allow Bhabha to design and develop nuclear devices. Although
this effort slowed when Shastri and Bhabha each died less than a year later, this episode
illustrates how domestic policy debates, some of which take place in the media and other
public fora, can offer valuable insights into the forces for and against nuclear arms
acquisition. Even when these debates take place in the secret chambers of government,
the intelligence agencies of the United States and some of its nonproliferation allies often
have the means to follow them.
Three of Bhabha’s claims proved especially consequential in India’s 1964 bomb debate.
Two weeks before China’s test, Bhabha reiterated an assertion he had made in several public
and private gatherings since 1959: India had the technical means to build and explode
a nuclear device within 18 months of a policy directive to do so.16 Then, a week after
the Chinese explosion, Bhabha targeted the government’s economic rationale against
building bombs. Citing data obtained from an international atomic energy conference,
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Bhabha claimed that production of a 10-kiloton nuclear device would cost only $368,000 and a
2-megaton bomb would cost $630,000*an order of magnitude cheaper than the (more
realistic) figures calculated by Shastri’s other aides and by U.S. experts.17
It is of little significance that these claims were not accurate: Bhabha’s well-timed
statements persuaded key Indian politicians and bureaucrats of the feasibility of making
nuclear weapons. The nuclear chief also was one of the first Indian officials to embrace
nuclear deterrence and disparage India’s traditional support for disarmament, things
he dared not do under Nehru’s watchful eye. Although U.S. officials tracked these
mythmaking activities closely, they failed to realize just how influential Bhabha’s
entrepreneurial activities were. And after Bhabha’s death, they failed to grasp how his
nuclear myths had survived*and in fact proliferated throughout the Indian bureau-
cracy*which largely explains why India tested nuclear weapons in 1998 and why the U.S.
government was so surprised by that event.18
Mythmaker Movements. Apart from the content and context of the nuclear myths
that are debated within policymaking circles of potential nuclear proliferators, another
indicator of possible proliferation activity is the coming and going of potential nuclear
mythmakers, particularly the scientists, engineers, and bureaucrats that run nuclear energy
programs. In some cases, such as during the Brazilian nuclear weapons campaign in the
1980s, key scientists involved in civilian nuclear energy applications may be recruited to
work on a parallel weapons development program. If the movement of these individuals is
monitored, their absence from civilian work might indicate that more nefarious activities
could be taking place. Also, when nuclear program managers and scientists travel
overseas, warning bells should go off. Even though most countries engaged in nuclear
research and development have peaceful international partnerships, sometimes the
foreign travels of key program officials can indicate that sensitive nuclear technologies are
being bought, sold, or bartered. As Torrey Froscher explains later in this issue, U.S. and UK
intelligence and policy officials finally managed to unravel the A. Q. Khan proliferation
network because of their vigilant monitoring of the movements of Khan and his
international associates.19
Finally, another sign that could indicate a significant change in a country’s nuclear
status is the promotion of a key nuclear mythmaker to a position of greater influence
within the government. For example, Raja Ramanna, who was director of the Bhabha
Atomic Research Center for over a decade, including during the time when India carried
out its first nuclear explosive test in 1974, and later science adviser to the defense minister,
was appointed defense minister in 1990 in the V. P. Singh government. This promotion
could have been taken as a sign that India was ramping up its weapons production work,
which in fact it was. Obviously, it is much harder to monitor the comings and goings of key
scientists and other nuclear mythmakers in closed and highly secretive societies, such as in
North Korea today. But an effort to understand the inner workings of even a difficult
intelligence collection target such as North Korea ought to be made.20
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Indicators of Changed Security Circumstances
At some basic level, all nuclear aspirant states seek the bomb to offset a real security
predicament. However, because not all threatened countries covet nuclear forces, the
emergence of a security threat, even a very intense threat, is not a surefire indicator that
proliferation is likely to follow. The rise of an acute security threat is a necessary*though
not a sufficient*condition for a country to start a nuclear weapons program. It might be
hard to detect, too. As the mythmaker framework highlights, not every civilian or military
member of a threatened country’s leadership will agree on the character or intensity of the
threat, or on the need to acquire nuclear forces to counter it.
Consider again the case of Pakistan in 1965. As noted above, Foreign Minister
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto believed that the threat of Indian aggression, as enabled by India’s
military buying spree following its 1962 border war with China, coupled with India’s
acceleration of its nuclear research and development program following China’s 1964
nuclear test, meant that Pakistan too should initiate a nuclear bomb effort out of its then
peacefully oriented nuclear energy research program.21 President Ayub Khan agreed
on the seriousness of the Indian military menace but downplayed the prospect of an
Indian nuclear arsenal and quickly decided that shoring up the military alliance with the
United States and modernizing Pakistan’s conventional forces would more reliably
ameliorate the country’s security problems.
Even though Pakistan did not try to go nuclear in 1965, India’s conventional military
buildup and apparent interest in nuclear weapons created the conditions for a serious
security debate in Pakistan, a debate in which competing myths and mythmakers battled
over the desirability, feasibility, and utility of nuclear arms acquisition. After Pakistan came
out on the losing side of the 1971 Bangladesh war, another, even more pained defense
debate ensued, and this time Bhutto*Pakistan’s most ardent nuclear mythmaker*
steered his country’s scientists and bureaucrats in the direction of nuclear arms production
and then redoubled this effort after India’s first nuclear test in May 1974*developments
that the U.S. government immediately grasped but was powerless to prevent.22
From an ‘‘indications and warnings’’ perspective, therefore, a major shift in a
country’s security situation*particularly the initiation or acceleration of a nuclear bomb
program by a neighbor*should highlight the need to scrutinize the interplay of that
country’s strategic myths and mythmakers in order to provide policymakers with early
warning about the creation or acceleration of a new national nuclear weapons program.
But it is vitally important to examine threat perceptions and debates on defense policy
options from the perspective of the country in question*not from an American, or
British, or French point of view. This is easier said than done.
Retired Pakistani army officer Feroz Hassan Khan contends in this journal that U.S.
nonproliferation policymakers failed to dissuade Pakistan from building nuclear bombs
because they never understood the intensity of Pakistani feelings of insecurity vis-a`-vis
India, especially after the 1971 Bangladesh war. For Islamabad, the establishment of a
robust nuclear deterrent has for decades been the conditio sine qua non of its national
survival. If Washington officials had come to grips with this fact, they would have known
that the wide array of nonproliferation measures enacted to dissuade Pakistan* from the
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‘‘carrots’’ of conventional military assistance and diplomatic pressures on India to the
‘‘sticks’’ of technology export controls and tough economic sanctions*could never have
worked. Pakistan was never like Libya, or even South Korea or Taiwan. The lesson to be
drawn from this experience is that nonproliferation analysts have to go to great lengths to
comprehend national feelings of vulnerability and the myths of nuclear security and
influence from the perspective of different strategic elites in the threatened countries*
even if they are friends of the United States who Washington believes ought not to be so
worried about their arguably exaggerated security concerns.
An even more challenging task is to understand threat perceptions from the
subjective perspective of adversary states. Empirically, it can be difficult to get
reliable information on how adversary leaders really see the world. But that is not the
only problem. Psychologically, it can be demanding to see how cruel the world looks from
the point of view of security officials in Tehran or Pyongyang, for example. Policymakers
also tend to downplay, or altogether dismiss, feelings of insecurity that their own actions
might cause among adversaries. Politically even, it can be risky for Western proliferation
analysts to empathize with the worldviews of adversaries, lest they be labeled as ‘‘soft’’ on
Iran or North Korea. This is one reason the U.S. government was so mistaken about Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) prior to the March 2003 war. Nobody could believe
that Saddam Hussein would unilaterally destroy his WMD stockpiles and abandon his
WMD production programs, both of which he worked so hard to create and conceal. But
that is exactly what he did*although he hid these facts from UN inspectors.23 Western
analysts might have grasped Iraq’s counterintuitive strategy if they had tried to look at
its defense dilemma from Saddam’s perspective, for they would have better understood
his competing security compulsions vis-a`-vis his Arab neighbors, Iran, the United States,
and even his own armed forces and population.24
While it is important for analysts to do what they can to understand the security
compulsions of threatened adversaries, they must be careful not to overshoot the mark.
Just as most politics is local, so too are most security threats. As U.S. Naval Postgraduate
School Professor Abbas Kadhim describes later in this issue, officials in Tehran often try to
justify their own strategic actions as reasonable responses to ‘‘aggressive’’ American
moves in the region; but even if this were true, it does not necessarily mean that the
Iranians would abandon their WMD programs if only the United States were to withdraw
from the region or offer credible security assurances that respect their political sovereignty
and territorial integrity.
Further on this point, in a recent Foreign Affairs article, Stanford University Professor
Scott D. Sagan offers some evidence that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons at least in part to
counter what it sees as hostile U.S. policies in the region, including the threat to launch
preventive military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. But Sagan’s recommendation
that Washington should offer Tehran limited security guarantees will not necessarily
reduce Iranian interest in nuclear weapons.25 It could be the case that Iranian elites want a
nuclear arsenal just as much*or even more*to counter Israel or its Arab neighbors, or
to promote Shia interests throughout the Persian Gulf region. The best way to find out is
to track and analyze Iran’s security perceptions and debates along with the content of its
nuclear myths and the movements of its mythmakers.
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Similarly, the best way to assess the impact that Iranian and North Korean nuclear
activities are having on their neighbors is to study the current interplay of public
statements, nuclear myths, and mythmakers in those surrounding countries. For example,
Kadhim observes that if Iran’s nuclear program continues to advance, Saudi Arabia and
Egypt are likely to consider more seriously their own nuclear weapons options. French
defense analyst Bruno Tertrais indicates in this issue that acceleration of Iran’s nuclear
effort is one of two factors that could drive Turkey to reconsider its opposition to
nuclear weapons (the other factor is a growing sense of alienation from the rest of
Europe).
The same dynamic is at work in Asia, where the underground nuclear explosive test
that North Korea conducted on October 9, 2006 is certain to have a significant impact on
the security calculations of Japan and South Korea. As James Clay Moltz discusses in this
issue, the North Korean test could tilt the defense debate in each of these countries in
favor of the myth of nuclear security. World analysts and policymakers no doubt have their
attention focused on the reactions of Tokyo and Seoul. The statement of Japan’s new
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe that as a result of Pyongyang’s ‘‘unpardonable’’ action, the
region was ‘‘entering a new, dangerous nuclear age,’’26 is a clear sign that Tokyo is
considering all possible policy responses, including the creation of its own nuclear force.
This in turn will lead outside analysts to examine changes in the orientation of Japan’s
nuclear energy program.
Indicators of Nuclear Program Dynamics
The most reliable way to detect whether a country is building nuclear weapons is to
observe it in the act. However, there are two problems with this approach. The first is that
states such as Iran and North Korea go to great lengths to conceal their weapons-related
research and development activities. Western intelligence agencies might not be able to
penetrate the elaborate ‘‘denial and deception’’ efforts of these countries to gain a
complete picture of the status of their bomb programs. The second problem is that
technical ‘‘observables’’ will only be observable well after a country has sorted out the
domestic political and international security ramifications and feasibility calculations of
going nuclear. Thus, while it is absolutely essential to monitor a country’s technical
progress on nuclear weapons production, this approach cannot provide concerned
policymakers with early warning of an impending nuclear program. Because it can be
much easier to block or dissuade a nuclear aspirant very early in the arms development
process, measures to provide early warning are critical. Fortunately, there are many
technical warning signs that can be tracked by governmental as well as non-governmental
analysts to gain awareness of the early steps of a nuclear program before it really gets up
and running.
Scientific Training and Education. Unless a country has a very well-developed
nuclear energy program, such as Japan has today, one of the first steps a nuclear weapons
aspirant must take is to send its scientists and engineers abroad for training and education
in weapons-related fields. Although President Ayub Khan decided against a Pakistani
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION OVER THE NEXT DECADE 443
bomb program in the mid-1960s, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, first when he was minister of fuel,
power, and natural resources and later as foreign minister, took it upon himself to send
dozens of Pakistani scientists and engineers to the United States and Europe for scientific
training and education, a move that paid off later when he decided to initiate a bomb
program. In the case of Iraq, numerous students were sent abroad for scientific education,
and many of them did not even know about the Iraqi nuclear weapons program until they
finished their degrees and returned to Iraq. Other Iraqi students were aware of the bomb
program, and were used by the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission to collect technical
studies or locate equipment needed by the clandestine effort.27 Knowledge of the subjects
students are sent abroad to study, and awareness of any suspicious activities in which they
might be engaged, can provide important clues to the intentions of potential nuclear
weapons aspirants.
Procurement Efforts. To initiate a nuclear weapons production program, a country
must devise a procurement strategy and infrastructure to import sensitive materials and
technologies most of which fall under the export control laws of supplier countries. Several
indicators of proliferation intent may be revealed by these activities. The first set of
indicators has to do with the nature of the technology and materials a country is trying to
acquire. For example, Rublee writes in this issue that in the early 1960s, when Egypt
suddenly mounted a frantic campaign to acquire a large heavy water reactor ostensibly for
nuclear power (after turning down generous offers of smaller or more proliferation-
resistant reactors), this was a clear sign that Egypt had become interested in an indigenous
source of weapons-grade plutonium. Mark Fitzpatrick, a senior fellow at the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, also writes in this issue that Western governments initially
became concerned about Iran’s nuclear intentions when it too attempted to purchase
heavy watermoderated power reactors and research reactors, both of which are well
suited for producing plutonium.
The target of a country’s acquisition efforts also can be an indicator of a new
orientation in that country’s nuclear policy. Again according to Rublee, throughout the
1960s the Egyptians approached the Soviet Union and China, both established nuclear
weapon states, for technical assistance, and also allegedly for the transfer or purchase of a
nuclear device. To cite a more recent case, Naval Postgraduate School professor Michael S.
Malley writes elsewhere in this volume that media reports of secret meetings between the
Burmese and North Korean militaries have raised the possibility that Burma may be trying
to obtain North Korean technical assistance to start a nuclear bomb program.
Finally, the manner in which a procurement program is organized may reveal
important clues about the objectives of a country’s nuclear program. During the 1990s, for
example, Saddam Hussein created a large network of Iraqi front companies using several
illicit revenue streams to procure illicit goods, services, and technologies for Iraq’s WMD-
related programs. Iraqi intelligence agents operating out of Iraq’s embassies facilitated
these efforts, as did officials in various Iraqi ministries, including the Ministry of Trade,
Ministry of Oil, and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. In addition,
numerous Iraqi and foreign trade intermediaries disguised illicit items, hid the identity of
the end user, and changed the final destination of the commodity to get it to Iraq.28 This
complex pattern of illicit procurement provided many clues to concerned government
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observers about the status and scope of Iraq’s WMD programs. However, the Iraq case also
demonstrates that reliance on any one set of indicators can create a false image of a
country’s weapons program, for Iraqi procurement efforts apparently continued even after
Saddam decided to destroy his WMD stockpile and halt WMD production.29
The Role of Military and Intelligence Organizations in Nuclear Efforts. Another
indicator of nuclear weapons-related activity is the involvement of military or intelligence
officials and organizations in ostensibly civilian nuclear research and development
programs. In the case of Iraq, Saddam used the Iraq Intelligence Service (also known as
Mukhabarat) to undertake the most sensitive procurement missions, and the Ministry of
Defense also played a major role in clandestine procurement for Iraq’s WMD programs.30
Iraq is not alone in this regard. Fitzpatrick writes that there are at least 10 indictors of
Iranian military involvement in Iran’s nuclear program, starting from the front end of the
fuel cycle all the way through to various aspects of weaponization. Citing numerous
findings of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Fitzpatrick points out that the
Iranian armed forces have been involved in the nation’s uranium mining, milling,
and centrifuge enrichment efforts*a situation that would be difficult to imagine if Iran’s
nuclear program were strictly peaceful. In addition, he notes that the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps has been linked to an undeclared Iranian activity known as the Green Salt
Project, concerning a key step in the conversion of uranium ore into uranium hexafluoride,
a product that then can be enriched into weapons-grade material.
What Do Indicators Indicate?
Understanding the conditions and events that cause nuclear proliferation and monitoring
the wide array of indicators that show the proliferation process is occurring or may soon
occur are critical for the communication of early warning to policymakers. However, the
‘‘outcome’’ that analysts must try to discern is not the same for all nuclear weapons
aspirants. In other words, the ‘‘dependent variable’’ of proliferation can vary considerably.
Robert Einhorn, a former U.S. nonproliferation official now with the Center for Strategic
and International Studies in Washington DC, writes in this issue that the future path for
any nation (or non-state actor) to nuclear arms acquisition will be different than the first
nine or ten nuclear-armed states mainly because the international community is now
much more aware of and concerned about the threat of proliferation. Because every
nation that might seek nuclear forces in the future is currently a non-nuclear weapon NPT
member, and therefore subject to strict IAEA safeguards, Einhorn reasons that future
nuclear weapon states must either operate a clandestine program without being detected
or develop overt fuel-cycle capabilities with the intention of withdrawing from the NPT at
some future point*or both.
Apart from this basic pathway choice potential proliferators must make, the goals,
means, urgency, and secrecy associated with their nuclear programs also may vary
substantially. Rather than trying to obtain declared, tested, and weaponized capabilities in
the shortest time possible, Einhorn writes, new nuclear aspirants might pursue more
cautious, incremental, and ambiguous policies. The goal of a nuclear program might be to
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acquire workable weapons rapidly, or it might be to create a bomb option through a
hedging, or ‘‘standby,’’ strategy, whereby the essential technical and personnel require-
ments are established but a bomb decision is deferred.31 New proliferators might attempt
to obtain fissile material clandestinely through dedicated weapons-related facilities or
instead through overt, dual-use nuclear facilities. The leadership might be content with
assembling its nuclear capabilities in a slow, measured manner (as Argentina and Egypt
seemed to do, and Pakistan did from 1972 to 1974), or it might embark upon a crash
weapons-development program (as Pakistan did after India’s 1974 nuclear test).
Finally, the secrecy and compartmentalization associated with a nuclear bomb
program can vary, with some countries being able to conceal their program from the
outside world for many years through elaborate denial and deception techniques. As
defense analyst and former U.S. nonproliferation official Lewis A. Dunn observes in his
article in this issue, proliferators innovate just as quickly as do the backers of the
nonproliferation regime: future proliferators will seek new ways to beat the system,
possibly from moving nuclear bomb programs offshore, to forming proliferation joint
ventures.
These variations also apply to countries that had initiated nuclear bomb programs in
the past only later to suspend or terminate their weapons-related activities. U.S. National
Defense University analysts Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters explain later in this issue
that although Taiwan and South Korea both ‘‘rolled back’’ their weapons development
programs, they did so in different ways and to different capabilities. After pursuing nuclear
weapons from the late 1960s through the mid 1970s, Taiwan undertook a substantial
reduction in its nuclear program over the next decade, eventually going so far as to
eliminate its ability to produce fissile material. South Korea’s rollback process also took a
long time, but its fissile material production capability was more modest to begin with,
and the rollback did little to reduce it. In fact, evidence has emerged that South Korea has
conducted uranium enrichment experiments as recently as 2000.32 The key lesson here is
that causal dynamics, warning signs, and even policy responses will vary according to the
choices that nuclear proliferators make.
Policy Measures to Prevent Further Proliferation
Obtaining early warning of an impending decision or activity related to the production of
nuclear weapons is critical because it allows policymakers to act quickly to block or
dissuade the proliferation process before the would-be nuclear weapon state has
too much to lose by reversing course. But policymakers have to know which tools to
use to achieve the desired effects. Once again, valuable insights are provided by the
nuclear mythmaker framework and by the authors of this special issue. Two sets of policy
measures appear to be particularly important: policies designed to influence the main
myths about nuclear security, nuclear influence, and strategic utility and policies aimed at
altering calculations about the political, technical, and economic feasibility of producing
nuclear weapons.
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Policies to Influence Nuclear Myths
According to the mythmaker model, the most important determinant of proliferation is
the victory of the myth of nuclear security in the halls of national power. On the surface,
this observation may seem obvious, but it can also point policymakers in a useful direction
for halting the forward progress of a country toward nuclear arms production. When a
nation faces a deteriorating threat environment, and national elites argue that fielding
a nuclear deterrent is the best corrective for stabilizing their security situation, then the
international community must offer credible alternatives to shore up that country’s
security* in terms that will succeed in the domestic defense debate. As Dunn observes,
U.S. security alliances with other states have been the most effective nonproliferation
measures ever taken. But he goes on to remark that the security alliance in Europe, which
dissuaded at least Germany, Italy, and Sweden from going nuclear, and the security
alliance in Northeast Asia, which dissuaded Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan from building
bombs, were essentially ‘‘free goods’’ for nonproliferation.33 The impetus for these
alliances was the fear of the Soviet Union, not the fear of proliferation. Tertrais writes that
the same holds true for the European Union today, where non-nuclear weapon status is
a requirement for membership (except for Britain and France). Both authors argue that
future success in containing the spread of nuclear weapons almost certainly will require a
greater willingness on the part of the United States, Europe, and others to invest more
directly and heavily in nonproliferation.
Of course, there are many circumstances in which the United States, on its own, will
not be able to influence the security calculations of a would-be proliferator. Hersman and
Peters explain that U.S. security guarantees were sufficient to convince the Taiwanese and
South Koreans that they need not possess their own nuclear forces. But the same cannot
be said about Turkey over the next decade. As Tertrais writes, Turkish defense planners
may have some doubts about the credibility of Washington’s commitment to Turkey’s
security, but they have far graver concerns about the attitude of the European members of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on this score. Assuring Ankara that its
security interests are best met through NATO collective defense mechanisms will require a
renewed trans-Atlantic consensus. Similarly, building and strengthening security partner-
ships in Asia will be essential to mitigating the strain placed on South Korea and Japan by
North Korea’s mounting nuclear weapons capability.
Outside of its formal security pacts, Washington should reenergize defense
dialogues with all of the countries threatened by the Iranian or North Korean nuclear
weapons programs. For example, although Saudi Arabia and Egypt are not covered by any
formal U.S. security guarantee, the United States could beef up the ‘‘Cooperative Defense
Initiative’’ (CDI) it launched in 1998 to enhance the ability of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) states, along with Jordan and Egypt, to prepare their forces to operate effectively in
nuclear, biological, and chemical environments, to improve the interoperability of these
forces with U.S. troops, and to increase the capability of these countries’ domestic
agencies to deal with a WMD event on their territory.34 U.S. officials should also make it a
priority to conduct candid dialogues in annual bilateral defense talks with the threatened
countries in Southwest and Northeast Asia.
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Because the myth of nuclear security can be influenced by less tangible forces as
well, concerned countries ought to do what they can to enhance the nonproliferation
norm that now prevails in the ‘‘security communities’’ of Latin America and Southeast Asia,
to cite two prime examples. As Trinkunas relates later in this issue, states in Latin America
are rarely subject to the security dilemmas, existential threats, or arms races more common
in other world regions. If Latin American countries continue to value democracy, economic
liberalism, and low defense budgets, and generally seek nonconfrontational means to
manage their regional disputes, then it will remain difficult for any nuclear mythmaker to
mobilize elite or mass interest in this region for developing nuclear deterrent forces.
Similarly, Malley writes that no country in Southeast Asia faces an immediate strategic
threat comparable to that found in Northeast Asia or the Middle East. Moreover, because
all countries in the region (except the newly formed East Timor) belong to the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations, the guiding principle of which has been noninterference in
each other’s affairs and nonmilitarization of bilateral and regional disputes, there is little
thought given to developing nuclear weapons.35 This trend ought to be supported as a
matter of U.S. nonproliferation policy.
By the same token, Washington should consider how it could shape ‘‘nuclear
influence’’ calculations in key regions of the world. Although some authors in this special
issue indicate that this could be accomplished best if the United States deemphasized
nuclear weapons in its defense strategy, such an approach might have unintended
harmful effects on the myths of nuclear security, especially within the countries that are
threatened by their neighbors’ nuclear weapons and are reassured by strong U.S. security
commitments that rely on the possible use of nuclear weapons. Dunn provides a more
practical suggestion when he writes that the United States should do its best to anticipate
and leverage future proliferation shocks, such as a nuclear weapons accident in India or
Pakistan, a confirmed theft of nuclear materials or a weapon, or a successful or aborted use
of nuclear weapons by a state or a non-state actor.
Finally, counterproliferation policymakers would do well to consider how best to
influence the calculations possible proliferators make about the strategic utility of
possessing and deploying nuclear weapons. As Dunn reminds us, effective U.S. defense
capabilities to counter new powers armed with WMD can shape the calculus of any given
state about the likely political and military benefits it would achieve by owning and using
nuclear weapons.36 However, there is little clarity on exactly how this process works or
could work better.
Policies to Influence Feasibility Calculations
As observed above, the mythmaker model challenges the conventional distinction
between proliferation motivations and capabilities as the target on nonproliferation
efforts. Arguments about the political and strategic benefits of nuclear weapons
ownership are tightly connected to calculations about the technical, economic, and
political feasibility of acquiring nuclear arms. For that matter, beliefs about the different
kinds of feasibility associated with a weapons program are interconnected. Influence one
set of nuclear myths and you might just influence the other.
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Political Feasibility. Anything that can be done to raise the political costs to
proliferators for going nuclear should be given high priority. Clearly, the world’s reaction
to North Korea’s nuclear test will influence how other countries assess the costs of building
and testing nuclear weapons. This episode will be watched closely in the capitals of all
potential proliferators*as will the Iranian case. If Tehran is not forced to pay a heavy
political price for violating its commitments to the NPT and the IAEA and defying the will
of the United Nations (UN) Council, then how much hope is there that even wealthier and
stronger countries, such as Japan and South Korea, or Egypt and Turkey, would cringe at
the thought of the political opprobrium that would follow their moves down the path
toward nuclear arms acquisition? This issue lies at the center of the nuclear nonprolifera-
tion regime, but as Dunn observes, the United States and its international partners have
been far more effective at establishing nonproliferation institutions than sustaining them.
Unfortunately, as Einhorn relates, any further erosion of the nonproliferation
regime* including additional NPT withdrawals, new discoveries of covert programs, or
additional failures of the international community to make treaty violators pay a high
price for non-compliance*also affects the popularity of the myth of nuclear security. If
more states become less confident that the regime will be able to constrain the nuclear
ambitions of their neighbors and adversaries, then their own security dilemma would be
exacerbated. As a result, the incentives for them to pursue their own nuclear bomb
programs would increase, just as the barriers to these actions would likely decline.
Technical Feasibility. Einhorn also writes that despite the international diffusion of
scientific knowledge and engineering expertise, the technical barriers that new prolif-
erators would encounter will remain formidable. For less industrially developed countries,
such as Burma, Venezuela, or Saudi Arabia, the ability to produce fissile material, not to
mention the complex task of weaponization, is not possible for the foreseeable future.
Even more industrially and scientifically advanced countries, such as Turkey, Egypt, and
Taiwan, would encounter significant technical hurdles that probably would cause lengthy
delays in possible weapons development campaigns. Recent policy initiatives, such as
stricter domestic and international export controls, the Proliferation Security Initiative, UN
Security Council Resolution 1540, and measures to combat illicit nuclear financing have
helped to fill key technical gaps in the nonproliferation regime.
Despite these positive developments, it is often argued that the growing
international demand for energy coupled with increasingly problematic oil and natural
gas supplies will make the world more dependent on nuclear energy, and that the
projected expansion of the commercial nuclear energy system will create new
opportunities for a new generation of nuclear proliferators to obtain the means to
make their own fissile material. Stanford University nuclear analyst Chaim Braun examines
this problem in this issue and concludes that the general nuclear energy system of 2016
will not be much different than the system of 2006, and that the nonproliferation regime,
especially if it continues to experience incremental improvement, ought to contain the
likely proliferation risks stemming from sustained nuclear energy growth. However, Braun
goes on to write that in the decade after 2016 the rate of new reactor construction might
accelerate, and new technologies such as fast breeder reactors and their associated fuel
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cycles might also begin coming on line. It is anyone’s guess at this point in time how these
possible developments would affect the future proliferation environment.
There is one other new development, or wild card, that could create real
complications for the United States and its nonproliferation partners: the rise of non-
state actors on the supply side as well as the demand side of the nuclear proliferation
equation. Elsewhere in this issue, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School Professor James A.
Russell analyzes how by 2016 non-state actors are likely to penetrate deeper into the
proliferation business, which heretofore has largely been dominated by states (with
the notable exception of A. Q. Khan’s non-state nuclear proliferation network). There are
four dimensions to what Russell calls the non-state proliferation market substructure: (1)
diversion of the legitimate trade in dual-use items for nuclear programs run by states and
non-state actors; (2) front companies and subsidiaries of quasi-governmental organizations
in states such as Iran and Pakistan circumventing export controls on their indi-
genous nuclear programs; (3) illicit smuggling networks in nuclear and radioactive
materials administered by states, transnational criminal organizations, and terrorist
organizations; and (4) servicing of demand by these illicit networks from violent non-
state actors that seek unconventional and conventional weapons that can be used for
tactical, operational, and strategic effects. How the international community will deal
with these emerging actors and forces in the marketplace for nuclear weapons remains to
be seen.
Economic Feasibility. The creation and completion of a nuclear weapons program
are still expensive propositions*but just how expensive building bombs would be for a
new proliferant state is difficult to predict. Elsewhere, I estimated the construction,
logistical, and operational costs of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear deterrent forces just
after their May 1998 nuclear tests to be somewhere in the range of several billion dollars
each.37 By way of comparison, one analyst estimated that the United States spent more
than $400 billion to manufacture its arsenal of nuclear weapons from 1940 to 1996.38 For
new proliferators, actual prices may vary. The scale of the weapons program matters, as do
the degree to which the bomb effort is embedded in an existing nuclear energy program,
the technological choices the country makes, the balance of imports to indigenous
production, and the local labor and industrial market costs. If the actual costs are
significantly higher than the estimates the mythmakers portray to senior decisionmakers,
as was the case with Homi Bhabha in India’s big bomb debate in the mid-1960s, then the
United States and its nonproliferation partners should be prepared to insert more realistic
calculations into national nuclear debates*but only in an honest and credible manner.
Financial and industrial opportunity costs also should be considered when
calculating the economic feasibility of producing nuclear weapons. Again take the case
of South Asia. India and Pakistan are afflicted with some of the world’s worst poverty.
Widespread unemployment, outdated infrastructure, rising food prices, and low living
standards have plagued each society (although these factors are changing, especially in
India). At the time of its 1998 nuclear tests, India’s per capita gross domestic product of
$390 ranked in the bottom fifth worldwide; Pakistan’s was only slightly better. Each
country ranked in the bottom quarter of the world in the UN Development Program
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(UNDP) Human Development Index.39 According to one Indian estimate, a single Agni
missile costs as much as the annual operation of 13,000 health care centers. More than
3,000 public housing units could be built for the price of one nuclear warhead. The
expenditures required to develop India’s ‘‘minimum’’ deterrent could meet 25 percent of
the yearly costs of sending every Indian child to school.40 Nearly every Pakistani child
could be educated and fed for the cost of the nuclear and missile arsenal that is being
created for their ‘‘protection.’’
To be sure, every government is willing to allow its population to suffer in some
measure to attend to its supreme national security interests. For the past 30 years, the
‘‘human needs’’ or ‘‘anti-nuclear’’ mythmakers in India and Pakistan have consistently lost
out to those countries’ pro-nuclear mythmakers. That trend shows no sign of change. But
in countries such as Japan, Turkey, and Egypt, where the nuclear myth debates are
presumably in very early stages, it is not clear how the leadership will come down on
the economic feasibility question. Anything the United States can do to influence that
domestic dialogue could pay rich dividends. And even in cases where it appears that the
pro-nuclear mythmakers have won out, such as in Iran and North Korea, nonproliferation
policymakers would do well to recall the main lesson of the rollback of nuclear bomb
programs in Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa: With the passage of time and changed
economic, political, or security circumstances, certain feasibility calculations become less
credible while alternate views become more appealing. As a result, the costs of
maintaining nuclear weapons programs may come to be seen as excessive, especially
relative to the benefits of reengagement with the world economy and polity. Thus as
Dunn reminds us, buying time is worth doing so as a means of waiting for ‘‘something
good to turn up.’’
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